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Access to Grantee Records Under the Freedom of
Information Act: An Analysis of Forsham v. Harris
A group of private physicians and scientists specializing in the treatment
of diabetes organized the University Group Diabetes Program (UGDP)'
to conduct a long-term clinical study2 of the effectiveness of certain diabe-
tes treatment regimens.3 Two of the regimens involved treatment of diabe-
tes with phenformin 4 and tolbutamide,5 which belong to a class of drugs
known as oral hypoglycemics. 6 The National Institute of Arthritis, Metab-
olism and Digestive Diseases, 7 pursuant to statutory grant-in-aid authority
of the Public Health Services Act, 8 funded the program entirely. Although
the Institute had a right of access to the data accumulated by UGDP and
could have obtained permanent custody of the documents upon request, it
did not exercise either of these rights. As a result of the clinical investiga-
tions, UGDP published several reports implicating both phenformin and
tolbutamide in increased cardiovascular mortality.9 Relying on these re-
1. The program was conducted at 12 university medical centers. The processing and
analysis of data was performed at the UGDP Coordinating Center, University of Maryland,
under the direction of Dr. Christian Klimt. See Kolata, Controversy Over Study of Diabetes
Drugs Continues For Nearly a Decade, 203 SCIENCE 986 (1979).
2. The study focused on the treatment of adult-onset diabetes mellitus. Diabetes mel-
litus is a metabolic disease in which carbohydrate utilization is reduced due to a deficiency
in insulin production. The disease is characterized, in part, by elevated blood glucose levels.
Adult-onset diabetes mellitus is generally a mild form of diabetes that develops gradually in
obese individuals over the age of 35. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 385 (4th unabr.
lawyers' ed. 1976).
3. Over 1000 patients were recruited for the UGDP study. Each patient was placed on
a standard diabetic diet and was assigned randomly to one of four treatment categories: (1)
fixed dose of tolbutamide; (2) fixed dose of insulin; (3) variable dose of insulin; or (4) pla-
cebo tablets. In 1963 a fifth patient group, treated with fixed doses of phenformin, was
added. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,587 (1975).
4. Phenformin, a biguanide, is a synthetic organic compound that lowers elevated
blood glucose levels in diabetics. The drug's precise mode of action is unknown. PHYSI-
CIANS' DESK REFERENCE 880 (32d ed. 1978).
5. Tolbutamide is a member of a class of organic compounds known as the
sulfonylureas. It functions to lower blood glucose levels in diabetic patients by stimulating
the synthesis and release of endogenous insulin. 1d. at 1716.
6. Oral hypoglycemics may be divided into two classes on the basis of chemical struc-
ture, the biguanides and the sulfonylureas. Although the drugs of each class operate
through different modes of action, both classes reduce blood sugar levels in diabetic patients.
7. The National Institute of Arthritis, Metabolism and Digestive Diseases is one of
several institutes of the National Institutes of Health and is authorized by statute to conduct
and fund research on diabetes. 42 U.S.C. §§ 289a, 289c-1 (1976). The Institute is a compo-
nent of the Public Health Service, which is a component of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare. The Institute, the Public Health Service, and HEW are federal
agencies within the meaning of the FOIA.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 241(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1978).
9. Klimt, Knatterud, Meinert & Prout, A Study of the Effects of Hypoglycemic Agents
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ports, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposed labeling
changes for the oral hypoglycemics.' 0 Although the proposal has yet to
become effective, I the FDA subsequently reported that phenformin was
not safe' 2 and ordered it withdrawn from the market. 13 Contending that
the results of the UGDP study were unreliable,' 4 the Committee on the
Care of the Diabetic, an unincorporated association of physicians who
treat diabetes, petitioned the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW) and the FDA to gain access to the raw patient data pursuant
to the disclosure mandates of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).' 5
After repeated denials of their requests for what they alleged were agency
on Vascular Complications in Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, 19 DIABETES 747 (Supp. 2,
1970); Knatterud, Klimt, Osborne, Meinert, Martin & Hawkins, A Study of the Effects of
Hypoglycemic Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, 24
DIABETES 65 (Supp. 1, 1975); Knatterud, Meinert, Klimt, Osborne & Martin, Effects of Hy-
poglycemic Agents on Vascular Complications in Patients with Adult-Onset Diabetes, 217
J.A.M.A. 777 (1971).
10. 40 Fed. Reg. 28,587 (1975). The Commissioner of the FDA specifically cited the
results of the UGDP study as the basis of the proposal. Id. at 28,593. The FDA regulates
the content of drug labeling pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 355, 371(a) (1976).
II. The FDA originally proposed a labeling change in 1971. In response to heavy criti-
cism of UGDP by the medical community, the National Institute of Arthritis, Metabolism
and Digestive Diseases contracted with Biometric Society, a private professional society of
biostatisticians, to review the UGDP. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 6 n.7. The soci-
ety published its report in 1975, concluding that the evidence of phenformin's dangers was
moderately strong, but conceding that they had some reservation concerning the conclusion
that oral hypoglycemics were toxic. Report of the Committeefor the Assessment of Biometric
Aspects of Controlled Trials of Hypoglycemic Agents, 231 J.A.M.A. 583 (1975). The FDA
subsequently conducted its own audit of the UGDP data and determined that while some
errors were noted, the basic conclusions of the study were sound. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,732,
52,733 (1978). Because of the continuing controversy surrounding the reliability of the
study, the FDA extended the period for comment on the labeling proposal to September 14,
1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 42,714 (1979).
12. 44 Fed. Reg. 20,967 & 20,977 (1979). The primary concern of the FDA was the
association between the use of phenformin and the development of lactic acidosis, an often
fatal condition in which abnormal amounts of lactic acid accumulate in the blood. Reports
of this association began appearing soon after the approval of phenformin's New Drug Ap-
plication in 1959 and resulted in labeling changes in 1964, 1970, 1974, 1976, and 1977. Id. at
20,967. UGDP did not study this condition. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. The
FDA received the UGDP reports as evidence of the dangers of phenformin, but they were
not the substantial basis of the FDA Commissioner's final order. 44 Fed. Reg. 20,967,
20,969 (1979).
13. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,995 (1978). The FDA may withdraw approval of a New Drug
Application if new clinical evidence, unavailable at the time of the application's approval,
indicates that the drug is "not shown to be safe for use under the conditions of use upon the
basis of which the application was approved." 21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(2) (1976).
14. Criticisms of the study have been pervasive and have focused largely on the design,
methodology, and execution of the program and on the personal integrity of one of the
principal investigators. See Kolata, supra note 1.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). The Committee on the Care of the Diabetic had petitioned
the FDA to rescind the proposed labeling change in 1971 pending independent evaluation of
the UGDP reports. Appendix at 18, Forsham v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 978, 63 L. Ed. 2d 293
(1980). The Committee subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, seeking injunctive relief to prevent the FDA from implementing
the proposed labeling change and also seeking access to the UGDP raw data. The grant of a
preliminary injunction was vacated by the First Circuit Court of Appeals and the case was
remanded to the FDA for exhaustion of administrative remedies. Bradley v. Weinberger,
483 F.2d 410 (lst Cir. 1973).
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records, 16 the Committee sued under the FOIAI7 to require HEW to make
available all raw patient data. Granting summary judgment for the de-
fendant, the district court found that the raw data were not agency records
because HEW had neither custody nor control of the records.' 8 The court
of appeals affirmed on the same rationale, noting that the FOIA applies
only to already existing records that have been created or obtained by an
agency in the course of its business.' 9 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Held, affirmed: Written data generated, owned, and
possessed by a private organization receiving federal study grants are not
agency records within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act
when copies of the data have not been obtained by a federal agency sub-
ject to the Act. Forsham v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 978, 63 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1980).
I. DEFINITION OF AGENCY AND AGENCY RECORDS UNDER THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act, enacted in 1966 as an amendment to
the information section of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946
(APA), 20 provides the public with broad access to information concerning
the workings of the federal government. 2' The Act requires governmental
agencies to make records available upon request of any person for any
reason 22 unless the requested records fall within one of nine exempted cat-
egories. 23 If access to records is wrongfully denied, an aggrieved party
may seek judicial review to enjoin the withholding and to order disclo-
sure.
24
Before an FOIA request for disclosure is granted, the requesting party
16. Brief for Plaintiff-Petitioners at 3.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
18. Forsham v. Mathews, No. 75-1608 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1976), reprinted in Appendix at
180-8 1. The district court observed that none of the federal defendants had ever possessed
the UGDP data and that the data were "the property of the individual investigators and
UGDP study coordinating enter [sic] and remain[ed] in the possession, custody and control
of the UGDP study coordinating center." 1d. The court failed to note that both the Biomet-
ric Society and the FDA had obtained portions of the raw patient data for evaluation and
audit by relying on the Institute's right of access. Forsham v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 978, 981, 63
L. Ed. 2d 293, 300-01 (1980).
19. Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
20. Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
21. Before the amendment, the public information section of the APA provided that
"matters of official record ... be made available to persons properly and directly concerned
except information held confidential for good cause found." Id. § 3(c). The "properly and
directly concerned" test was used by various agencies as authority for withholding informa-
tion and it was this abuse that prompted Congress to amend the APA. See H.R. REP. No.
1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCEBOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTI-
CLES, S. Doc. No. 82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as [1974] FOIA
SOURCEBOOK].
22. 5 U.S.C.. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
23. Id. § 552(b). Most litigation concerning FOIA requests has centered on the ques-
tion of which agency records are exempt under this section. The controversy surrounding
the UGDP study focused on whether the data were agency records. Accordingly, the ex-
emptions were irrelevant to the controversy.
24. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
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must establish that the entity petitioned is an agency and that the records
sought are agency records. 25 Despite the clear intent of Congress to man-
date the fullest possible disclosure of agency business,26 the statutory lan-
guage and the legislative history of the Act provide little guidance in
determining the scope of FOIA obligations. 27 As enacted in 1966, the
FOIA did not include a definition of agency, but instead relied on the
definition provided in the Administrative Procedure Act. 28 The APA's
definition, however, proved troublesome for FOIA purposes because the
general statutory guide was of limited usefulness to courts confronted with
the task of evaluating the complex organization of the federal bureau-
cracy. 29 In 1974 the FOIA was amended in an attempt to extend its cover-
age to those entities "which perform governmental functions and control
information of interest to the public.' ' 30 In addition to those administra-
tive units designated in section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 3'
the new definition of agency included "any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corpora-
tion, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government
(including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regu-
latory agency."'32
Despite the 1974 amendments, confusion remained as to whether enti-
ties from the private sector involved in governmental work were agencies
within the scope of the FOIA.33 Receipt of federal funds alone does not
25. Id. § 552(a)(3).
26. Much of the legislative history of FOIA is reprinted in [1974] FOIA SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 21. The history of the 1974 amendments may be found in SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-
502), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as [1975] FOIA SOURCEBOOK]. See gen-
erally Clark, Holding Government Accountable. The Amended Freedom of Information Act,
84 YALE L.J. 741 (1975); Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Ci-I. L.
REV. 761 (1967); Note, The Freedom of Information Act. A Seven- Year Assessment, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 895 (1974).
27. For a discussion of the definitions of records, agency, and agency records under
FOIA, see Note, The Definition of "Agency Records" Under the Freedom of Information Act,
31 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1979).
28. 5 U.S.C. § 551(I) (1976). This section defines agency as "each authority of the Gov-
ernment of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another
agency." Id. Specifically exempted from this definition were Congress and federal courts.
Id. §§ 55 1(1)(A)-(B). Whether Congress intended to include the Office of the President
under the obligations of the APA is unclear. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
29. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 245-46
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
30. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1975] FOIA
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 26, at 121, 128.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 551(l) (1976).
32. Id. § 552(e).
33. Private individuals and institutions performing government work fall into several
categories. One group, represented by private grantees such as UGDP, receive federal funds
because of "general... [government] approval of the undertaking." Mason, Current Trends
in Federal Grant Law-Fiscal Year 1976, 35 FED. B.J. 163, 166 (1976). The work performed
by such grantees is not viewed as work done for the benefit of the federal government, but
rather for the furtherance of social goals. Id. at 167. In other instances individuals from the
private sector may be called upon to function in an advisory capacity to agencies. The work
performed is the work of the agency, although the individuals themselves are not considered
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convert a private group into an agency.34 The courts confronting this
problem have adopted a functional analysis, conferring agency status for
FOIA purposes when the group in question is subject to federal supervi-
sion. 35 Under this test, however, the supervision must be substantial.36 In
United States v. Orleans37 the United States Supreme Court held that a
local community action agency funded by the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity was not a federal agency within the meaning of the Federal Tort
Claims Act.38 The Court found that the controlling issue was not whether
the community group received federal funds or whether it was obligated to
comply with federal regulations effectuating the philosophy of the grant
program, but whether the group was supervised in its daily activities by the
federal government. 39
Without supervision, a private group also may be deemed an agency
when it functions with "substantial independent authority in the exercise
of specific functions. ' '40 In such cases the controlling issues are whether
the group is functioning under legal authority delegated from Congress 41
and whether it is involved in a final decision-making process.4 2 In con-
to be employees of the federal government. See Washington Research Project, Inc. v. De-
partment of HEW, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Wu v.
National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
926 (1973); Wolfe v. Weinberger, 403 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1975). Individuals from the
private sector also may supply property and services for the benefit and use of the govern-
ment under procurement contracts. The property supplied becomes the property of the con-
tracting agency. See 41 U.S.C. § 503 (Supp. 11 1978).
34. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976); Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d
1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 874 (1974).
35. Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In Rocap the court held that the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was a federal agency within the statutory guide-
lines of the FOIA. For examples of government-supported institutions or programs held not
to be agencies, see Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(UGDP); Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977) (National Academy of Sciences). Congressional
conferees, clarifying the reach of FOIA's definition of agency, have indicated that Congress
did not intend "to include corporations which receive appropriated funds but are neither
chartered by the Federal Government nor controlled by it, such as the Corporation for Pub-
lic Broadcasting." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974), reprinted in
[1975] FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 26, at 219, 231-32. The Corporation for Public
Broadcasting is funded under authority of 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-398 (Supp. 11 1978).
36. Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
37. 425 U.S. 807 (1976).
38. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 (1976).
39. 425 U.S. at 815.
40. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
41. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Public Citizen Health Research
Group v. Department of HEW, 449 F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C. 1978). For federal entities held
not to be agencies due to their lack of independent legal authority, see Lombardo v. Han-
dler, 397 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 932 (1977); Gates v. Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1973).
42. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Public Citizen Health Research
Group v. Department of HEW, 449 F. Supp. 937 (D.D.C. 1978). The Soucie controversy,
involving the agency status of the Office of Science and Technology, was decided prior to the
1974 amendments when the APA definition of agency determined the success of FOIA re-
quests. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1976). An analysis of the legislative history behind § 55 1(I) indi-
cated that "Congress, in using the term 'agency,' intended the APA to apply to authorities of
19801
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trast, entities functioning merely to advise or to recommend, but not to
implement a final action, have not been designated agencies.4 3
No statutory or congressional guidance has been provided to determine
what constitutes an agency record. The FOIA does not define agency
records44 and the legislative history is silent on the matter.4 5 Two trouble-
some questions arising from this deficiency have confronted the courts:
first, whether agencies may be compelled to create records for FOIA re-
quests;46 and secondly, under what circumstances records generated by a
private organization funded by a federal agency may be considered agency
records. 47
The courts have designated records as agency records when they are
owned by an agency or subject to agency control.48 Under this prop-
erty/control theory, mere reliance by an agency upon records49 or posses-
sion of records,50 without ownership, is not sufficient to show that the
government which are the center of gravity for the exercise of substantial power against
individuals." Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1970). Use of this criterion is apparent in decisions constru-
ing the definition of agency under § 552(e) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976). Ciba-
Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Wolfe v. Weinberger, 403 F.
Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1975).
43. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of HEW, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460
F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); Wolfe v. Weinberger, 403 F.
Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1975).
44. While the Act does not define agency record, it characterizes the type of documents
that are exempt from disclosure obligations as matters, information, memorandums, letters,
files, and reports. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). These references, admittedly vague, indicate
that writings memorializing agency activity are contemplated as the proper subjects of FOIA
requests. See Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 671
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972). In Nichols the court found that the written
autopsy report of President Kennedy was an agency record, but that bullets, cartridges, and
the late President's shirt were not records within the scope of FOIA obligations. 325 F.
Supp. at 134-36.
45. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1975]
FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 26, at 219; H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966),
reprinted in [1974] FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, at 22; S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in [1974] FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, at 36. See also Com-
ment, What Is a Record? Two Approaches to the Freedom of Information Act's Threshold
Requirement, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 408.
46. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
47. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
48. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1312, 63 L.
Ed. 2d 759 (1980); SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976); Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. Department of HEW, 477 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979);
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Nichols v. United States,
325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966
(1972). In Goland the court held that congressional documents on loan to the CIA were not
agency records under the FOIA because the records in question had not passed from the
control of Congress. 607 F.2d at 346-47. Congressional documents are exempt from disclo-
sure under 5 U.S.C. § 551(l)(A) (1976). When an agency creates a record and retains con-
trol over it, the record is within the scope of the FOIA. Public Citizen Health Research
Group v. Department of HEW, 477 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979). Litigation may arise con-
cerning whether the record is exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). 477 F.
Supp. at 599-605.
49. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Mathews, 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
50. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1312, 63 L.
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materials sought are accessible under the FOIA. Furthermore, the courts
have decided that an agency may not be ordered to create records in re-
sponse to an FOIA request 5' or to produce records that are not in its physi-
cal possession.52 Rather, the judicial requirement for control demands not
only a clear title to the property in question but also a present possessory
interest in that property. 53 The decisions, however, do not make clear
whether the cumulative effect of federal involvement in the creation of
records by private organizations through federal funding and supervision,
federal access to records, and federal reliance upon records is sufficient to
bring the records held by the private grantees within the scope of FOIA
obligations.
II. FORSHAM V. HARRIS
In Forsham v. Harris the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, 54 held that data generated under a federally funded re-
search grant to private recipients are not agency records accessible under
the FOIA unless they have been obtained by the funding agency. 55 The
decision was premised on the finding that UGDP was not an agency as
defined in the FOIA.56 Rejecting an expansive definition of agency
records that would impose obligations of disclosure upon private grantees
independent of their agency status,57 the Court stated that if private grant-
ees are not agencies, their records are not agency records. 58
The Court initially observed that private grantees are not only excluded
from the FOIA definition of agency59 but that the legislative history of the
1974 FOIA amendments indicates that Congress intended to exclude such
groups.60 The Court also stated that the exclusion of private grantees from
Ed. 2d 759 (1980); SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976). The SDC
Dev. Corp. holding indicates that not all documents owned by an agency are subject to the
FOIA. Rather, the type of document, in relation to the underlying purposes of the FOIA, is
the controlling issue. Refusing to find reference materials owned by the National Library of
Medicine agency records, the court in SDC Dev. Corp. stated that the "type of documents
Congress was seeking to include . . . were primarily those which dealt with the structure,
operation, and decision-making procedure of the various governmental agencies." Id. at
1119.
51. Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 421 U.S. 168 (1975); NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975). In Grumman and Sears the Court held that an
agency is not required to create a record in response to an FOIA request. In Forsham the
records in question were already in existence.
52. Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 671 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972).
53. 325 F. Supp. at 137.
54. The decision was divided seven to two, with Justices Brennan and Marshall dissent-
ing.
55. 100 S. Ct. at 983, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 302-03.
56. Forsham v. Mathews, No. 75-1608 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1976), reprinted in Appendix at
180-81.
57. 100 S. Ct. at 985, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 305.
58. Id. at 983, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 302.
59. Id. at 984, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 303.
60. Id. The Court noted that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting was not intended
by Congress to be included in the FOIA definition of agency. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1380,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974), reprinted in [1975] FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 26, at
1980]
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agency status is consistent with a congressional and judicial tendency to
preserve private grantee autonomy. 61 Refusing to apply the FOIA to the
UGDP data, the Court adopted the opinion of the appellate court that the
interest in disclosure must be balanced with the interest in respecting the
privacy and property rights of private grant recipients.62 Citing United
States v. Orleans,63 the Court found that a federal grant does not create a
joint venture or partnership with a private grantee and that the work of the
grant recipient does not become the work of the government unless the
grantee's activities are subject to extensive, detailed, and daily federal su-
pervision.64 Finding the requisite degree of federal supervision absent in
the UGDP program, the Court concluded that UGDP could not be consid-
ered an agency of the federal government.65 Rather, the Court found that
the government involvement in the UGDP program was consistent with
the typical grantor-grantee relationship and necessary only to ensure com-
pliance with the policy goals of the grant.66 To support its conclusion, the
219, 231-32. This concern for the status of the Corporation, however, did not specifically
extend to other recipients of federal funds. 120 CONG. REC. 6803 (1974). During congres-
sional hearings, Representative Young proposed that disclosure be required of records of
grant recipients but this suggestion elicited no comment from his colleagues. Id. at 6809.
Under these circumstances, the Court's interpretation of the conference report concerning
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting may be expansive. The Court also noted that sev-
eral bills designed to extend the FOIA to federal grantees have been introduced in the
House but that none has been reported from committee. 100 S. Ct. at 984 n.10, 63 L. Ed. 2d
at 303 n.10. See also H.R. 1465, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3207, 95th Cong., ist Sess.
(1977); H.R. 1205, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); H.R. 1291, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.
11,013, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Of course, congressional failure to enact legislation can-
not be equated with a statement of intent. The cumulative effect of these observations, how-
ever, does tend to support the Court's conclusion.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 984, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 303-04.
62. Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The concern for balancing
the interest in disclosure with the interest in preserving private grantee autonomy is more
apparent in the lower court decision in which Judge Leventhal noted that "Congress struck a
balance in fashioning the FOIA, which precludes the boundless pursuit of one policy goal,
even a dominant policy, to the exclusion of all countervailing considerations." Id. at 1137.
See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). Congress also recog-
nized that the FOIA should not be applied indiscriminately to deprive individuals and insti-
tutions of their privacy. See S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in [1974]
FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 21, at 36. See also Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792
(D.D.C. 1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977), in
which the circuit court, holding that the National Academy of Sciences is not a federal
agency, stated that the "strength of the F.O.I.A. is the concept of public accountability for
the operation of federal agencies. It was not intended to be applied directly to private enti-
ties which merely contract with the government to conduct studies." 397 F. Supp. at 802.
63. 425 U.S. 807 (1976). In Orleans a child was injured in an automobile accident while
on an outing sponsored by a local community action agency funded entirely by the Office of
Economic Opportunity. The child and his father sued the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, alleging that employees of the action agency were federal employees by
virtue of the Office of Economic Opportunity's financial support of the agency's programs.
The Court held that the action agency was not an agency within the meaning of the Act and
that its employees were not instrumentalities of the federal government. Id. at 819.
64. 100 S. Ct. at 984, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 304.
65. Id. The Court conceded that grantees may be considered agencies under some cir-
cumstances. 1d. at 983 n.9, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 303 n.9. The circumstances, however, refer to the
Orleans requirement for day-to-day supervision. Id. at 984 n. 11, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 304 n. 11.
66. Id. at 984 n. 11, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 304 n. 11. The Court did not respond specifically to
petitioner's contention that the National Institute's involvement in the UGDP was signifi-
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Court noted that the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act of
197767 provides that a procurement contract 68 must be used when the pur-
pose of the funding is to acquire property and services for federal use and
benefit, whereas grant69 and cooperative70 agreements, such as those to
UGDP, must be used when money is given to "accomplish a public pur-
pose of support or stimulation."'7 ' Accordingly, the products of grants are
not' the property of the federal government, and instead, title to records
vests in the individual researcher. 72
Regardless of the degree of federal supervision and funding of the
UGDP, the petitioners contended 73 that the UGDP raw data were agency
records because of HEW's right of access to the records74 and the FDA's
reliance on the results of the UGDP study in administrative actions.75 Re-
jecting this argument, the Court observed that the FOIA applies only to
records presently in the custody of an agency. 76 Therefore, only records
which "have been in fact obtained, and not [those] which. . . could have
been obtained" are agency records and thus the proper subjects of FOIA
requests. 77 The Court found this interpretation to be consistent with the
language of the FOIA78 as well as with the congressional definition of gov-
cantly greater than that of the typical grant program. Brief for Plaintiff-Petitioners at 28-36,
The involvement described by petitioner, however, falls short of the standards enunciated in
Orleans. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815 (1976).
67. 41 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (Supp. 11 1978). Although the Act was passed in 1978, after
the funding of the UGDP, legislative history indicates that Congress intended to "formalize
existing relationships." S. REP. No. 449, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1977).
68. 41 U.S.C. § 503 (Supp. 11 1978).
69. Id. § 504.
70. Id. § 505.
71. Id. § 504(1).
72. Id. §§ 504-505. The Court also found support in the HEW regulations governing
grants. 100 S. Ct. at 985, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 304. The Court referred to 45 C.F.R. § 74.133
(1979), which provides that "title to real property, equipment, and supplies acquired under a
grant . . . shall vest, upon acquisition, in the grantee." Upon examination of this language,
the Court's interpretation that title to records and data are included in this provision is
difficult to accept. Section 74.24 of these regulations provides, however, that "HEW...
shall have the right of access to. . . records of the grantee which are pertinent to the HEW
grant, in order to make audit, examination, excerpts, and transcripts." Id. § 74.24(a). Im-
plicit in this regulation is a recognition that the records are the property of the grantee.
73. Brief for Plaintiff-Petitioners at 37-50.
74. In addition to § 74.24, § 74.21 of the HEW regulations requires grantees to retain
grant-related records for a period of three years and authorizes the granting party to gain
custody of records possessing long retention value or of records that are "continuously
needed for joint use." 45 C.F.R. § 74.21(c) (1979). The regulation, however, appears to
refer to financial and equipment records, and its applicability to data is uncertain. See Brief
of the American Council on Education, Association of American Medical Colleges, et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Respondents at 11-12.
75. See note 10 supra and accompanying text and note 13 supra.
76. 100 S. Ct. at 987, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 307.
77. Id. (emphasis in original).
78. Id., 63 L. Ed. 2d at 306. The Court noted that § 552(b)(4) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(4) (1976), applicable to exemptions for trade secrets and confidential information,
refers to information possessed by an agency that has been "obtained from a person," and
that no similar exemption applies to confidential information in records that have not been
obtained by an agency. Relying on this plain language, the Court interpreted this omission
as indicating that Congress intended the FOIA to apply only to records actually in the pos-
session of an agency. 100 S. Ct. at 987, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 307. In addition, the Court inter-
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ernment records in other legislation. 79 Additionally, the Court noted that
to order HEW to exercise its right of access would be tantamount to com-
pelling HEW to create records,80 an argument previously rejected by the
Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.81 Finally, the Court found that
the FDA's reliance on the published reports of UGDP in initiating regula-
tory action, in the absence of federal ownership of the underlying data,
was irrelevant.8 2
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, submitting that
the critical question in Forsham was whether the data generated by the
UGDP study were agency records, and not whether UGDP was an
agency.83 Justice Brennan found nothing in the legislative history of the
FOIA to compel the conclusion that a common law theory of property and
custody should define agency records,84 and he dismissed the majority
opinion as one based on the "technical niceties of who 'owns' crucial docu-
ments. ' 85 Maintaining that the congressional intent behind the FOIA was
to promote the fullest possible disclosure,86 Justice Brennan proposed that
when the existence of a close link between a record and an agency is
demonstrated, and when the record contains information essential to the
understanding of that agency's activities, the record should be accessible
under the FOIA.87 According to Justice Brennan, the necessary link be-
tween the records of a private grantee and a federal agency would be es-
tablished when the agency incorporates the records into a regulatory
process.8 8 Justice Brennan found such a link in Forsham because of
HEW's role in conceiving, funding, and supervising the UGDP study.89
preted the remedy provided for wrongful withholding as being indicative of a requirement
that records sought under an FOIA request actually be in the custody of an agency. Id.
79. 100 S. Ct. at 986, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 305-06. See Presidential Records Act of 1978,
§ 2(a), 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2) (Supp. 11 1978) ("created or received by the President"); Records
Disposal Act, § 4(c)(2), 44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976) ("made or received" by an agency); Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78x (1976) ("documents filed with or otherwise ob-
tained").
80. 100 . Ct. at 987, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 307-08.
81. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
82. 100 S. Ct. at 987-88, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 308. The requirement for actual possession of
records becomes more apparent upon examination of the decision in the companion case of
Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 100 S. Ct. 960, 63 L. Ed. 2d 267
(1980), in which the Court held that the FOIA does not compel agencies to retrieve records
wrongfully taken from their possession.
83. 100 S. Ct. at 988, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 308.
84. Id. at 988-89, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 309.
85. Id. at 989, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 309.
86. Id. at 988, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 309.
87. Id. at 989, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 309.
88. Id., 63 L. Ed. 2d at 310.
89. Id. Under Justice Brennan's test, a link must be established between an agency and
the records in question and that agency must have used the data in a regulatory or adminis-
trative action. Justice Brennan apparently does not view the National Institute of Arthritis,
Metabolism and Digestive Diseases and the FDA as separate agencies. Although both ad-
ministrative units are components of HEW, no contention was made in this controversy that
the units had a joint involvement in the UGDP study. The court of appeals viewed the FDA
and the Institute as separate agencies and noted that the question of reliance would be ap-
propriate only to possible litigation against the FDA concerning its regulatory actions based
on the UGDP results. Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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He further determined that this involvement was substantial enough to in-
dicate that HEW, in fact, had created the data for a governmental pur-
pose. 90 The actions of the FDA and HEW concerning oral hypoglycemics
could be evaluated only by examining the raw data because the FDA's
reliance on the published reports of the UGDP was tantamount to an en-
dorsement of the accuracy of the entire study. 9' Therefore, Justice Bren-
nan concluded that the data were clearly agency records92 and were
retained by UGDP only because HEW had elected not to exercise its right
of access. 93
Justice Brennan's suggestion that the Court's technical requirement for
actual ownership considerably narrows the scope of the FOIA contrary to
congressional intent to provide for openness in government affairs94 may
be unfair in view of federal policies designed to preserve the autonomy of
private grantees. 95 Government officials and legal scholars have recog-
nized that receipt of federal funds by private grantees should not be
viewed as converting the work product of grantees into federal projects.96
Typically, a research grant is awarded to promote a general social policy,
and is rooted in the belief that self-reliance and autonomy of the re-
searcher is "necessary to scientific excellence. ' 97 Under these circum-
stances, the government plays the role of an "interested and concerned
donor." 98 The Forsham Court, in light of these countervailing considera-
tions, refused to extend FOIA obligations to individuals who traditionally
have not been regarded as associated with the federal government.99
90. 100 S. Ct. at 990, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 311. Justice Brennan does not compare the agency
involvement in the UGDP study with the day-to-day supervision standard required under
the Orleans decision. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 815 (1976). Because Forsham
involved the additional factor of agency reliance on the work product of a grantee, Justice
Brennan may have viewed the Orleans test as irrelevant to the controversy.
91. 100 S. Ct. at 989-90, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 310. Unlike the majority, Brennan found the
reliance issue central to the resolution of the controversy. He states that the UGDP study
was one of HEW's "basic sources" when it suspended phenformin as an imminent hazard.
Id. at 990, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 310. The facts of the case indicate, however, that the suspension
of phenformin was not based on the UGDP warning of cardiovascular complications but on
the association between use of phenformin and the development of lactic acidosis. See note
12 supra. In fact the agency reliance has been limited to proposed regulatory action that has
yet to become effective because of claims that the UGDP reports are unreliable. See notes
I I & 14 supra. Accordingly, the reliance that Brennan found to be determinative should not
be held as sufficient to compel disclosure of the raw data.
92. 100 S. Ct. at 990, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 311.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 991, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 311.
95. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
96. See Mason, supra note 33; Staats, Federal Research Grants, 205 SCIENCE 18 (1979).
97. Staats, supra note 96, at 19.
98. Willcox, The Function and Nature of Grants, National Institute on Federal Urban
Grants- Policies and Procedures, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 125, 130 (1969).
99. The Court noted that "Congress found that federal funding and supervision did not
justify direct access" to grantee records and declined to find that "those identical activities
were intended to permit indirect access through an expansive definition of 'agency
records.'" 100 S. Ct. at 985, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 305.
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